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Defendant and appellant First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. ("First Security") respectfully submits this reply brief in 
response to the arguments stated in the brief submitted by 
plaintiff and appellee America First Credit Union (the "Credit 
Union"). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-106: 
"Account" means any right to payment for 
goods sold or leased or for services 
rendered which is not evidenced by an 
instrument or chattel paper, whether or 
not it has been earned by performance. 
"General intangibles" means any personal 
property (including things in action) 
other than goods, accounts, chattel 
paper, documents, instruments, and 
money. All rights to payment earned or 
unearned under a charter or other 
contract involving the use or hire of a 
vessel and all rights incident to the 
charter or contract are accounts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-203(1): 
(1) Subject to the provisions of 
Section 70A-4-208 on the security 
interest of a collecting bank, Section 
70A-8-321 on security interests in 
securities, and Section 70A-9-113 on a 
security interest arising under the 
chapter on sales, a security interest is 
not enforceable against the debtor or 
third parties with respect to the 
collateral and does not attach unless: 
(a) the collateral is in the 
possession of the secured party 
pursuant to agreement, or the 
debtor has signed a security 
agreement which contains a 
description of the collateral and 
in addition, when the security 
interest covers crops growing when 
the security interest covers crops 
growing or to be grown or timber to 
be cut, a description of the land 
concerned; 
(b) value has been given; and 
(c) the debtor has rights in 
the collateral. 
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III. Utah Code Ann, § 70A-9-318(3): 
(3) The account debtor is 
authorized to pay the assignor until the 
account debtor receives notification 
that the amount due or to become due has 
been assigned and that payment is to be 
made to the assignee. A notification 
which does not reasonably identify the 
rights assigned is ineffective. If 
requested by the account debtor, the 
assignee must seasonably furnish 
reasonable proof that the assignment has 
been made and unless he does so the 
account debtor may pay the assignor. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND FULL OPINION 
As is made clear in First Security's briefs, several 
courts have ruled on the principal issue presented to this court 
for decision. Although Utah law is consistent with the position 
taken by these other courts, it is not clear and explicit. For 
planning purposes in the area of secured transactions, it would 
be helpful to have a clear holding on the issue of the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-318(3). For this reason, 
First Security respectfully requests that the Court issue a fully 
reasoned opinion in this case. 
For the same reason, First Security requests oral 
argument to assist the Court in the decision process. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE CREDIT UNION HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT ITS PURPORTED 
NOTICE MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 70A-9-318(3). 
The Credit Union has failed to show that its notice of 
assignment adequately met the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-9-318(3). Section 318(3) provides as follows: 
(3) The account debtor is 
authorized to pay the assignor until the 
account debtor receives notification 
that the amount due or to become due has 
been assigned and that payment is to be 
made to the assignee. A notification 
which does not reasonably identify the 
rights assigned is ineffective. If 
requested by the account debtor, the 
assignee must seasonably furnish 
reasonable proof that the assignment has 
been made and unless he does so the 
account debtor may pay the assignor. 
The cases consistently hold that section 318(3) requires that the 
account debtor be notified both that the account has been 
assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. City of 
North Miami v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co.. 505 So.2d 511 
(Fla. App. 1987); Union Investment, Inc. v. Midland-Guardian Co., 
30 Ohio App. 3d 59# 506 N.E.2d 271 (1986); Vacura v. Haar's 
Equipment, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1985); First Trust & 
Savings Bank v. Skokie Fed. Savings and Loan Assoc, 126 111. 
App. 3d 42, 466 N.E.2d 1048 (1984). Failing such notice, the 
account debtor may pay the account creditor. 
In this case, the notice provided by the Credit Union 
stated as follows: 
-3-
ASSIGNMENT OF SAVINGS CERTIFICATE 
We are holding as collateral on a Line of 
Credit Savings Certificate No. 984993 in the 
Amount of $99,999.00, in the name of 
Renaissance Exchange. Renaissance Exchange 
Inc. is willing to pledge this certificate as 
collateral on their loan with America First 
Credit Union. 
Renaissance Exchange, Inc. 
By:/s/ 
Title 
American First Credit Union is holding the 
original certificate as collateral. We would 
appreciate your acknowledgement of the 
Assignment, also confirming the balance of 
$99,999.00. This Assignment will be in 
effect until you have received written notice 
of our release of the Assignment. Please 
acknowledge the Assignment and the balance by 
signing below. One copy should be retained 
in your files. 
First Security Bank of Utah 
By:/s/ 
Title 
(Statement of Facts, 17.)1 There was no further contact between 
the Credit Union and First Security regarding the account held at 
First Security by Renaissance Exchange, Inc. ("Renaissance"). 
(Statement of Facts, 510.) Furthermore, the trial court 
specifically found that this notice "did not contain any 
instructions directing First Security Bank to take action. The 
credit union was simply notifying First Security Bank that it had 
References to "Statement of Facts" refer to the Statement 
of Facts located on pages 5 through 10 of First Security's 
opening brief. 
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an interest in the certificate of deposit." (Addendum "A," 
Sis.)2 
In attempting to show that the notice was adequate, the 
Credit Union argues that notice under section 318(3) need only be 
"reasonable," and that what is reasonable depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each case. The Credit Union then argues 
that its notice was reasonable under the particular facts of this 
case. 
First Security does not dispute that notice must be 
reasonable, and that reasonableness may be a function of the 
facts of the particular case. The Credit Union's rule of 
reasonableness, however, cannot write out of the law the 
requirement that the notice contain a direction that payment is 
to be made to the assignee. Even the cases cited in the Credit 
Union's brief contained a direction that payment be made. See, 
e.g., Hall Bros. Const. Co.. Inc. v. Mercantile National Bank, 
642 N.E.2d 285, 1994 WL 615303 (Ind. App. Nov. 9, 1994) ("until 
further notice, your payments due to the [account 
creditor/assignor] are to be made directly to the [assignee]"); 
Warrington v. Dawson. 798 F.2d 1533, 1534 (5th Cir. 1986) 
("please indicate by signing below that you will make all checks 
payable on this account to [assignor] and [assignee]"); General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Albany Water Board. 590 N.Y.S.2d 312, 
313 (App. Div. 1992) ("Dealer authorizes and directs Purchaser to 
References to "Addendum" refer to the addendum of First 
Security's opening brief. 
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make its checks in payment of the foregoing accounts payable to 
[assignee]"); Municipal Trust and Savings Bank v. Grant Park 
Community District Number 6. 171 111. App. 289, 525 N.E.2d 255, 
256 (1988) ("[We] would collectively appreciate you making all 
checks due [assignor] payable jointly to [assignee] and 
[assignor]"). 
The only case without a direction that payment was to 
be made to the assignee was First National Bank v. Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Co,, 91 N.M. 126, 571 P.2d 118, 
120 (1977), where the court held that no such direction was 
needed because the assignment at issue was an absolute 
assignment, as opposed to an assignment for collateral purposes. 
In First National Bank, the notice specifically advised the 
account debtor that the assignor retained no interest whatever in 
the account. It was unnecessary to tell the account debtor to 
pay the assignee because the assignee was now the only owner of 
the account. By contrast, in this case, the trial court found 
that the Credit Union merely advised First Security that it had 
an "interest in the certificate of deposit." (Addendum "A," 
1l9.) The notice itself states that the assignment is for 
"collateral" purposes. Thus, Renaissance clearly retained an 
interest in the account, which triggers the requirement of a 
direction that payment be made to the Credit Union. 
The Credit Union cites the following as the "particular 
facts" of this case that make its non-notice adequate: First 
Security's putting a hold on the account, America First's 
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possession of the Savings Certificate, and the fact that this is 
not an "indirect collection situation." Appellee's Brief, pp. 
30-31. These facts clearly do not save the notice. 
First, the fact that First Security set a "hold" on the 
account cannot serve as a substitute for proper notice. The 
Credit Union cites only one case for the proposition that the 
adequacy of notice may be affected by the account debtor's 
response. See Municipal Trust and Savings Bank v. Grant Park 
Community District Number 6. 171 111. App. 289, 525 N.E.2d 235 
(1988). It clearly is not a majority position. Furthermore, the 
notice in Municipal Trust does contain a direction to pay the 
assignee: 
This is to notify you that we are working with the 
aforementioned company [assignor] and thus would 
collectively appreciate you making all checks due 
[assignor] payable jointly to [assignee and assignor] 
until notice is given to discontinue said practice. 
525 N.E.2d at 256 (emphasis added). The notice contained an 
acknowledgement, which was signed by the account debtor: "I, the 
undersigned, hereby acknowledge the above and will comply with 
your request." Id. The court went on to hold that under the 
circumstances the notice fulfilled the requirement to "reasonably 
identify the rights of the assignee and reasonably demand payment 
to the assignee." Id. at 258. Municipal Trust in no way does 
away with the requirement that the notice contain a demand for 
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payment,3 Since the Credit Union's notice indisputably contains 
no direction at all regarding payment, it fails. 
Second, America First's possession of the Savings 
Certificate has nothing to do with any kind of notice to First 
Security. It may explain something concerning the knowledge of 
America First, but nothing about what America First told First 
Security.4 
Third, the Credit Union's "indirect collection" 
argument is answered by Union Investment. Inc. v. Midland-
Guardian Co., 30 Ohio App. 3d 59, 506 N.E.2d 271 (1986), where 
the court upheld the requirement of a demand for payment in a 
non-indirect collection situation. 
None of the Credit Union's "facts" can change Section 
318(3)'s fundamental requirement, confirmed in numerous cases 
cited in the briefs, that the notice contain a demand for 
payment. While the notice need not contain any specific "magic 
words," it must contain something. As the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson Trucking Co., Inc.. 
23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d 813 (1969), 
The fact, however, of such substitution 
of a new creditor must, in order to make the 
debtor liable to the assignee, be brought 
3Ironically, in post-trial briefing the Credit Union itself 
stated that an adequate notice must include a "demand certain," 
for payment, and made the preposterous claim that its notice made 
an "explicit" demand for payment. (Record at 234; Addendum "G," 
p. 10 n.2.) 
4It should be noted that although the certificate stated 
that it would not be cashed unless presented, it also had clearly 
expired. (Statement of Facts, Hll-12.) 
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home to the debtor with much exactness and 
certainty before he has paid the debt. . . . 
He must pay to his original creditor when the 
debt is due, unless he can establish 
affirmatively that someone else has a better 
right. The notice to him, therefore, must be 
of so exact and specific a character as to 
convince him that he is no longer liable to 
such original creditor . . . . 
458 P.2d at 876-77. The Credit Union's notice clearly fails this 
test because, as the trial court found, the notice contained no 
direction that First Security take any kind of action. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting judgment against 
First Security. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS ON 
THE ISSUE OF A CREDIT TO FIRST SECURITY. 
The Credit Union misses the import of First Security's 
argument that it should have received a $19,096.03 credit, based 
on the consolidation of collateral derived from the pay-off of 
the Valley Bank loan. The purpose of the third and final loan to 
Renaissance was to pay off Valley Bank so that collateral could 
be consolidated at the Credit Union, thereby strengthening its 
position as a secured lender. (Statement of Facts, Kl8.) That 
purpose was fulfilled, but only because Renaissance withdrew the 
funds in its account with First Security, from which it derived 
the additional $19,096.03 necessary to pay off Valley Bank. 
(Statement of Facts, 1116-18.) 
The consolidation of collateral was a benefit to the 
Credit Union. In fact, it was the primary purpose of the loan. 
(Statement of Facts, 1l8.) It "purchased" that benefit with the 
extra $19,096.03, which Renaissance used to repay its loan from 
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Valley Bank. For that reason, First Security should have 
received a credit in that amount. At the least, the trial court 
should have supported his legal conclusions on this issue with 
adequate factual findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in holding that the Credit Union 
properly complied with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) because the 
Credit Union's notice contained no direction that payment was to 
be made to the Credit Union. The court also erred in holding 
that First Security is not entitled to a reduction in damages 
equal to the portion of the account proceeds which were used to 
fulfill the principal purpose of the loan and in failing to 
prepare adequate findings in support of its legal conclusions. 
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be reversed 
and judgment entered in favor of First Security. In the 
alternative, judgment should be vacated and the case should be 
remanded for further findings. 
DATED this O 0 day of December, 1994. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
^1 
D£e R. Chambers ' 
Scott A. Hagen 
& 
-10-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed, postage-
prepaid, on this day of December, 1994, to the following: 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Michael T. Roberts 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
2404 Washington Blvd., Suite 900 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ftztfft. zfet^^n 
107257\SAH 
- 1 1 -
